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A VARIABLE NUMBER OF CHEERS FOR VIEWPOINTBASED REGULATIONS OF SPEECH
R. George Wright*
INTRODUCTION
If there is one thing we think we know about the First Amendment, it is
that speech restrictions based on viewpoint are especially objectionable. The
Supreme Court has declared that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”1 For this proposition, the Court has on one occasion cited
thirteen of its own precedents.2
Much more broadly, the Court has also held that a government “has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.”3 Focusing more specifically, though, on viewpoint-based
restrictions, the Court has declared that “[g]overnment discrimination
among viewpoints—or the regulation of speech based on ‘the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker’—is a ‘more
blatant’ and ‘egregious form of content discrimination.’”4
© 2021 R. George Wright. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
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each
copy
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citation
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Notre Dame Law Review Reflection, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.
1 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (political flag desecration case).
2 See id. The cases cited begin with the intentional infliction of emotional distress
case of Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988), extending historically to
the “red flag” display case of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368–69 (1931).
3 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)) (public sign restriction case); see also Iancu v. Brunetti,
139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (citing Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1762–63 (2017))
(trademark registration context); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010);
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49
(1991); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
4 Reed, 576 U.S. at 168 (quoting the university speech subsidy case of Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). In Reed, Justice Breyer, who is
often prone to engage in proportionalist interest balancing, refers to viewpointdiscrimination as “a strong reason weighing against the constitutionality of a rule.” Reed,
576 U.S. at 178 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 182 (Kagan, J.,
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However clear these statements may seem, they immediately raise various
problems of substance. Merely for example, is there any constitutionally
significant difference between prohibiting the expression of an idea entirely,
and merely restricting, in some contexts, the expression of that idea, perhaps
well short of complete prohibition? 5 Can viewpoint regulation ever be
motivated, to any degree, by any concern other than for the offensiveness or
disagreeableness of the regulated idea itself? 6 What about the regulation of
speech the government actually endorses on the merits, but fears is premature
for public discussion?7 Or what if a government that is quite sympathetic to
the idea in question but fears the uncontrollable consequences of a disruptive
“heckler’s veto” responds to the prospective speech?8 If the “hecklers” and
their sympathizers comprise only a very small fraction of all interested
persons, could they still qualify as the critical “society?”9 And what if the
government is again indeed sympathetic to the restricted idea, but believes
that the idea’s current dominance should be tested by legally advantaging, to
some limited degree, its minority, dissenting, or less well-funded critics?10
The idea that viewpoint-based restrictions of speech are distinctively
“egregious”11 also conceals a split between those who think of viewpoint-based
concurring in the judgment) (endorsing a rule of “strict scrutiny,” as distinct from an
absolute prohibition, in all cases of facial discrimination “on the basis of viewpoint”); Matal,
137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
5 Thus, the idea of “silencing” is ambiguous between suppression in only one or
more contexts or occasions, and a more thorough suppression. Note the reference to
prohibition in the Johnson flag burning case, 491 U.S. at 414; see also Nat’l Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 600–01 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting).
6 See Johnson, 491 U.S. 397; Finley, 524 U.S. 569. Note also the distinction between
viewpoint restriction and viewpoint discrimination. There may be a sense in which equally
restricting all viewpoints could equally and severely burden all viewpoints, but without also
discriminating against any viewpoint. “Discriminating” equally against all possible
viewpoints would undermine freedom of speech, but perhaps without discriminating
against, or treating unequally, any particular viewpoint. For a much broader and
sophisticated treatment, see Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality
and Freedom of Speech, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 320–25 (1997).
7 A regulating government might thus decide that public discussion of its own
ultimate aims would, for the present, be inexpedient.
8 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949) (invalidating a law that
“permitted conviction of petitioner” for speech that “stirred people to anger, invited public
dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest”); R. George Wright, The Heckler’s Veto
Today, 68 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 159 (2017).
9 The anticipated “hecklers” could, after all, be not only small in numbers, but
politically relatively powerless as well.
10 Regulating the expression of the clearly dominant viewpoint, for the sake of a more
level playing field, might be thought not merely to “equalize” speech, but to enhance
meaningful free speech, overall, on the topic in question. For background in a related
context, see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976).
11 See supra text accompanying note 4; see also Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299
(2019) (“The government may not discriminate against speech based on the ideas or
opinions it conveys.” Viewpoint discrimination amounts to an “‘egregious form of content
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regulations as absolutely illegitimate and irredeemable, 12 and those who
would merely apply some form of strict judicial scrutiny to such regulations.13
This dispute between judicial absolutism and a merely presumptive judicial
scrutiny of viewpoint-based restrictions requires some explanation.
One obvious such explanation would point to the common 14 assumption
that viewpoint-based restrictions, as a category, are uniformly and uniquely
egregious, or especially constitutionally harmful. 15 But as illustrated below,
this assumption is fundamentally mistaken.16

discrimination’ that is [however, only] ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’” (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995))); Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 436 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Viewpoint discrimination is
thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or the perspective
of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” (quoting Rosenberger, 519 U.S. at 828–
29)); Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone
of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 69 (2007) (“[T]he most universally
condemned threat to the foundations of free expression [is] . . . suppression based on the
regulator’s subjective disagreement with or disdain for the views being expressed.”).
12 See Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (noting how
in a traditional public forum, “restrictions based on content must satisfy strict scrutiny, and
those based on viewpoint are prohibited”); see also Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299; Morse, 551 U.S.
at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Redish, supra
note 11, at 109 (“What should not—and for the most part, has not been the subject of
serious dispute is that regulation of expression that is grounded in nothing more than
governmental hostility to the normative viewpoint to be expressed is unqualifiedly
unconstitutional. There can be no exceptions to the constitutional bar of viewpoint-based
regulations—at least in the context of coercive regulations and prohibitions.” (emphasis
added)); id. at 111 (“The absoluteness of the constitutional prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination flows from the unique harm that such regulations necessarily cause to the
foundations of free expression.” (emphasis added)). For commentary, see Robert C. Post,
Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 169, 169–72 (2007); Eric
Heinze, Viewpoint Absolutism and Hate Speech, 69 MOD. L. REV. 543, 546 (2006). More
broadly, see Clay Calvert, Iancu v. Brunetti’s Impact on First Amendment Law: Viewpoint
Discrimination, Modes of Offensive Expression, Proportionality and Profanity, 43 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 37 (2019).
13 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 182 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“[W]hen the restriction ‘raises the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace’—we insist that the law
pass the most demanding constitutional test.” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 386 (1992))); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30. There seems to be a consensus that
viewpoint-based, but not other content-based restrictions of speech, are prohibited in socalled non-public government owned fora. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009); Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d
226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019).
14 Except in the context of government-owned speech fora, as noted in Summum, 555
U.S. at 469–70, and in Knight First Amend. Inst., 928 F.3d at 237.
15 See the authorities cited supra notes 4, 11, 12.
16 See infra Part I.
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Crucially, viewpoint-based restrictions take on a wide range of quite
diverse forms.17 These diverse forms of viewpoint-based restrictions on speech
also vary widely in the nature and severity of any threat they pose to freedom
of speech, or to the basic values underlying freedom of speech. 18 So diverse
and variable are the forms of viewpoint-based restrictions that any general rule
of strict scrutiny in all such cases,19 much less any absolute prohibition
thereof,20 makes little constitutional sense. 21
Consider a bare typology of viewpoint-based restrictions, postponing any
clarification and any examples. Thus consider first a viewpoint-based
restriction of speech that we might well indeed think of as “egregious.” This
form of viewpoint-based restriction might involve a governmental attempt at
dictatorial repression.22 Of course, few governments rest their viewpointbased restrictions on a self-serving will to power alone. In the American
constitutional context, viewpoint-based speech restrictions are normally
claimed to be justified by reference to some sort of affirmative public value.23
Thus even clear cases of viewpoint-based speech restriction will normally
involve some degree of mixed-motive justification,24 in which the prominence
of any legitimate justifications will vary. And in such cases, the severity of the
speech-burden on regulated parties and audiences will also vary. 25
But not all instances of viewpoint-based restrictions will be clearly
identifiable as such, or even intended to be viewpoint-based. Thus there will
be dubious cases in which the courts and the restricting government itself fail
to acknowledge, or even recognize, the viewpoint-based elements of the
speech restriction in question.26 These cases may well overlap with the many
kinds of cases in which the viewpoint restriction actually does not reflect the
substantive, first-order policy views of the restricting government itself. 27
There are cases in which a government policy should, realistically, be
treated as a viewpoint-based restriction, even though the policy does not itself
refer to viewpoint, and where again no viewpoint bias may have been
intended.28 On the other hand, there are also cases of formal or explicit
viewpoint restriction with only a trivial actual constitutional impact on the
relevant speakers, in light of the quality of their remaining realistically
available alternative speech channels. 29
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See the authorities cited supra note 13.
See the authorities cited supra notes 11–12.
See infra Part I.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Sections I.C–I.D.
See infra Sections I.C–I.D.
See infra Sections I.C–I.D.
See infra Sections I.C–I.D.
See infra Section I.E.
See infra Section I.F.
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Then there are also viewpoint-based restrictions of speech, applied in
particular institutional contexts, where the speech restriction seems to be
intrinsic or essential to the functioning of the institution in accordance with
its own vital basic purposes.30 In such cases, again, it is difficult to see any
special “egregiousness,”31 much less any justification for any nearly absolute
rule regarding viewpoint-based restrictions of speech.
And finally on this bare, unelaborated typology, there are cases in which
the viewpoint basis of the speech restriction seems clear, but the
constitutional gravity of the restriction is debatable. In these cases, the focus
is not on institutional context as immediately above, but on the fundamental
nature and character of the speech that is subject to regulation. Viewpointbased regulation of pure commercial speech, with no pretense to any political
or other social content, may fall into this category. 32
Below, we elaborate on and explore this typology of the forms and
dimensions of viewpoint-based restrictions on speech. On this basis, we
ultimately show that the nearly universal claim that viewpoint restrictions are
uniquely dangerous, egregious, or damaging to the values of underlying
freedom of speech is actually unjustified. The idea of viewpoint-based
restrictions in itself is, despite its familiarity, actually not a useful concept.
I. THE DIVERSE FORMS AND DIMENSIONS OF VIEWPOINT-BASED RESTRICTIONS
ON SPEECH
A.

The Most Egregious Cases

The most egregious forms of viewpoint-based restrictions of speech
involve either broad or narrow governmental attempts at dictatorial
repression. Among the purest examples would be the classic dystopian
regime depicted in George Orwell’s 1984.33 The officially imposed language
of Newspeak therein rendered “the expression of unorthodox opinions,
above a very low level, . . . well-nigh impossible.”34 This broad, systematically
engineered inarticulability, and indeed inconceivability, of disfavored ideas
stands as the extreme case of viewpoint-based restriction of expression. At a
more personal level, 1984 depicts more dramatic specific forms of viewpoint
repression, as in the classic colloquy between Inner Party member O’Brien
and protagonist Winston Smith:
O’Brien held up his left hand, its back toward Winston, with the
thumb hidden and the four fingers extended.
“How many fingers am I holding up, Winston?”

30
31
32
33
34

See infra Section I.G.
See supra text accompanying notes 4, 11, 12.
See infra Section I.H.
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Plume Books 2003) (1949).
Id. at 320.
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“Four.”
“And if the Party says that it is not four but five—then how many?”
“Four.”
The world ended in a gasp of pain. The needle of the dial had shot
up to fifty-five.35

This incident, of course, illustrates the punishment and deterrence of
expressing officially disfavored views, rather than the broad, systematic
prevention of even entertaining any such views.
Whatever laudable goals may once have motivated the Party, it is clear
that at this point, the Party seeks primarily the deepening, extension, and
security of its own power. Free speech values such as the pursuit of truth36 are
of no interest to the Party. Rather than posing any sort of independent
constraint on party doctrine, truth is now to be subject to the Party’s dictates.37
Consider now some actual practices of former Soviet bloc regimes. Even
under the cynicism and careerism of the decaying Soviet bloc regimes,
conformity to official viewpoint norms was broadly enforced. The dissident
and future Czech President Vaclav Havel thus reported that he lived “in a
country where the authority and radioactive effect of words are demonstrated
every day by the sanctions which free speech attracts.”38 The imprisoned
Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky observed in turn that “Soviet citizens are
divided by a host of invisible barriers that determine what they can read.” 39
Polish dissident Czeslaw Milosz added that the Soviet-style regimes prohibited
“what has in every age been the writer’s essential task—to look at the world
from his own independent viewpoint, to tell the truth as he sees it, and so to
keep watch . . . in the interest of society as a whole.”40
Extreme forms of viewpoint-based speech repression have not gone
unnoticed in American free speech jurisprudence. Before the rise of modern
totalitarian regimes, Justice Holmes classically observed that “[p]ersecution
for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no
doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition.”41 But the motives underlying viewpoint-based restrictions more
35 Id. at 257.
36 See, classically, JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (Michael B. Mathias ed.,
Pearson Education 2007) (1859).
37 ORWELL, supra note 33, at 257.
38 Václav Havel, A Word About Words, in OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS 1965–
1990, at 377, 379 (Paul Wilson ed., First Vintage Books 1992).
39 NATAN SHARANSKY, FEAR NO EVIL 235 (Stefani Hoffman trans., 1998).
40 CZESLAW MILOSZ, THE CAPTIVE MIND, at xii (Jane Zielonko trans., Alfred A. Knopf
ed., 1953) (1951).
41 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (World
War I–era subversive advocacy case). See also the hypothetical case raised in R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992) (“[T]he government may proscribe [all] libel; but it
may not make the further content [and viewpoint] discrimination of proscribing only libel
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generally may be mixed, or only mildly objectionable, or even benign. Mixed
motives may be of all varieties. This mixture of motives may be simple, or
complex, again to any degree. Motives may change, in any direction, over
time. And the malevolence, or benevolence, of any single government motive
may again vary, to virtually any degree.
B.

Mixed Motives with Different Degrees of Objectionability

We see examples along the above spectra in the classic World War I–era
subversive advocacy cases.42 Consider, for example, the mixture and the range
of motivations for punishing acts of pamphleteering in Pierce v. United States.43
In Pierce, the government criminally punished the distribution, in particular,
of a pamphlet entitled “The Price We Pay.”44
This pamphlet was broad-ranging as to the subjects and perspectives
presented therein.45 Certainly, the speech-restricting government may have
been motivated, at least in part, by the understandable purposes of
discouraging inducement to “insubordination, disloyalty, and refusal of duty
in the military and naval forces of the United States.” 46 Or so we can imagine,
in the context of an assumedly just and vital war effort.
Relatedly, the pamphlet in question was thought to promote
“obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment service,” and to seek to
intentionally “interfere with the success of our military and naval forces in the
war in which the United States was then engaged.” 47 Again, assuming a legally
defensible war effort, these potential motives may be entirely reasonable,
given in particular the perceived need to maintain readiness against foreign
military threats to the values underlying freedom of speech.
The problem, for our purposes, is the likelihood of other motives, of one
degree of causal importance or another, where those additional motives are
less justifiable, in general or in light of the values underlying freedom of
speech. Thus the Supreme Court itself concluded in Pierce that the pamphlet
“contained much in the way of denunciation of war in general, the pending
war in particular, . . . [and an] assertion that under Socialism things would be
better.”48

critical of the government.”). The Court apparently assumed an absolutist prohibition of
at least this class of viewpoint-based regulations of speech, rather than referring merely to
strict scrutiny, implicitly raising the possibility of mixed governmental motives in imposing
viewpoint-based restrictions.
42 See, for example, the majority and dissenting opinions in Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, and
in Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (a Socialist presidential candidate convicted of
subversive advocacy).
43 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
44 See id. at 241–51.
45 See id. at 245, 249–50.
46 Id. at 249.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 245.
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Clearly, a government attempt to suppress, generally or in a particular
context, the view that socialism is preferable to some alterative, is no more
constitutionally justifiable than an attempt to suppress the antithetical view,
held by Winston Smith, that Orwell’s Ingsoc is objectionable.49
In Pierce, however, the federal government objected as well to the
defendant’s speech as allegedly calculated
to arouse suspicion as to whether . . . the Government was not more
concerned in enforcing the strictness of military discipline than in
protecting the people against improper speculation in their food supply;
and to produce a belief that our participation in war was the product of
sordid and sinister motives, rather than a design to protect the interest and
maintain the honor of the United States.50

The Supreme Court majority in Pierce took these latter claims to be provably,
if not knowingly, false, or “grossly false,” 51 rather than as legitimate political
arguments, of whatever strength or weakness. 52
Under the basic logic of freedom of speech, any speech that is not
independently criminal and that expresses any view of the causes of the First
World War should be constitutionally protected, whether the government
agrees with any such viewpoint or not. 53 The ultimate appeal in this and all
free speech cases must crucially be to the fundamental reasons for specifically
protecting speech in the first place. These reasons refer to values or goals
commonly thought to be promoted by a regime of freedom of speech. 54 As a
matter of consensus, these values or goals are said to include optimally
advancing the pursuit of knowledge and truth;55 meaningful participation in

49 See generally ORWELL, supra note 33 (Ingsoc, or English Socialism, is the Party’s
political ideology).
50 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 249–50.
51 See id. at 250–51.
52 As duly recognized by, unsurprisingly, Justices Brandeis and Holmes. See id. at 267–
69 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
53 See in particular John Stuart Mill’s argument for the legal protection of political
viewpoints widely judged to be partially, or even entirely, false. See MILL, supra note 36, ch.
2.
54 For standard typologies of free speech values, see, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY chs. 2–4 (1982); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130–47 (1989); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1016. See also, in our context, Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 100 (1996).
55 See EMERSON, supra note 54, at 6; SCHAUER, supra note 54, at 15; Greenawalt, supra
note 54, at 130; Heins, supra note 54, at 100; William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for
Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Free
Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. REV. 231, 232
(2017); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 649, 657 (1987); Tsesis, supra note 54, at 1016, 1038.
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democratic decisionmaking;56 promoting individual fulfillment or selfrealization;57 and reconciling the needs for both reasonable social stability
and meaningful social change. 58
Examining Pierce and other sorts of viewpoint-based speech restrictions
in light of these basic free speech values yields interesting results. 59 As it turns
out, viewpoint-based speech restriction cases are not reducible to a battle
between the speaker’s, and others’, free speech interests on one side, and one
or more nonspeech public interests, compelling or otherwise, on the other.
In some cases of viewpoint-based restrictions of speech, the government is
able to argue not only that the restriction promotes one or more public
interests but, as well, that the viewpoint restriction, while impairing basic free
speech values in some respects, also actually promotes one or more basic free
speech values in other respects.
Importantly, viewpoint-based restrictions on speech may indeed actually
promote one or more basic free speech values, to widely varying degrees.
These degrees may range from near zero, in the case of systematic Orwellian

56 See EMERSON, supra note 54, at 6; SCHAUER, supra note 54, at 35; Jack M. Balkin,
Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053 (2016); Ashutosh
Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1112–15 (2016);
Greenawalt, supra note 54, at 145; Heins, supra note 54, at 100; Robert Post, Participatory
Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011); Tsesis, supra note 54, at 1016,
1034; see also Corey Brettschneider, Value Democracy as the Basis For Viewpoint Neutrality: A
Theory of Free Speech and Its Implications for the State Speech and Limited Public Forums Doctrine,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 603 (2013).
57 See EMERSON, supra note 54, at 7; SCHAUER, supra note 54, at 48; C. Edwin Baker,
Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 253 (2011); Susan J. Brison, The
Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 312 (1998); Greenawalt, supra note 54, at 143;
Heins, supra note 54, at 100; Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1998); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 591, 593 (1982); Tsesis, supra note 54, at 1016, 1028; see also MILL, supra note 36, ch.
2.
58 See EMERSON, supra note 54, at 7; SCHAUER, supra note 54, at 35, 37; Greenawalt,
supra note 54, at 142; Tsesis, supra note 54, at 1017, 1020; Heins, supra note 54, at 100.
59 Consider, e.g., what turns out to be the structurally similar viewpoint-based publicschool-compelled flag salute case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 627–29, 640 (1943). In Barnette the viewpoint-based speech-burdening was arguably
motivated, in part, by a disdain for purported “insubordination,” as well as by a desire,
however ill-considered, for a sense of national unity against the military threat posed by the
Nazi tyranny of Adolf Hitler. See id. On the one hand, a desire to suppress student
“insubordination” of this sort is more damaging to than promotive of the basic purposes of
freedom of speech. In particular, the free speech value of promoting individual autonomy,
development, and self-realization is clearly impaired. See supra text accompanying note 57.
But on the other hand, the desire for expressive solidarity against the immense Nazi threat,
however possibly ill-considered, is clearly more compatible with essentially all of the basic
free speech values. See supra text accompanying notes 54–68. Hitler’s Nazi regime could
reasonably be seen as not merely a threat to American interests, as in a typical viewpointbased restriction case, but, in addition, as intentionally and directly antithetical specifically
to all of the basic free speech values themselves.
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government repression,60 to a significant degree, as in a hypothetical case of
a viewpoint-based speech restriction intended to effectively turn the tide of
battle against an invading Orwellian or Nazi 61 regime. It is certainly in the
broad public interest that both the Orwellian and the Nazi regime takeovers
be avoided. But preventing Orwellian or Nazi tyranny also directly and
substantially promotes, overall, each of the consensually basic free speech
values.62 The regimes of 1984 and the Third Reich, indisputably, are
essentially destructive of free speech values such as the optimal pursuit of
truth,63 meaningful political democracy, 64 and any recognizable conception
of personal autonomy, self-realization, or human flourishing.65 And this effect
is, crucially, a recurring matter of varying degrees among all viewpoint-based
restrictions of speech.
C.

Governmental Innocent Obliviousness Cases

In other kinds of cases, the government may well fail to recognize or
acknowledge, initially or at any later point, the viewpoint-basis and viewpoint
effects of the speech regulation in question. In the least controversial such
cases, the government may not intend, or even recognize, the potential for
viewpoint-based implementation of a speech regulation that seems viewpointneutral on its face. A typical such case, Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,66
involved nearly unlimited administrative discretion to impose permit costs on
potential speakers in any amount up to a specified maximum. 67 As the Court
held, “[n]othing in the law or its application prevents the official from
encouraging some views and discouraging others through the arbitrary
application of fees.”68 This degree of unconstrained, if formally neutral,
discretion was held to have “the potential for becoming a means of
suppressing a particular point of view.” 69
In this kind of case, bias in practical implementation may be conscious,
or unconscious and unintended, or even nonexistent. Thus such speech
regulations may vary widely in their actual impact on speakers and on the basic
free speech values.70 And more importantly, speech permitting schemes will
not always track the largely unconstrained discretion in Forsyth.71 Many such

60 See supra text accompanying notes 33–37.
61 See supra note 59.
62 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
63 See supra text accompanying note 55.
64 See supra text accompanying notes 54 & 56.
65 See supra text accompanying notes 54 & 57.
66 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
67 See id. at 130–34.
68 Id. at 133.
69 Id. at 130–31 (quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 649 (1981)).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
71 See Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130–34.
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permitting schemes, for example, may require of the administrator some
degree of evidence-based reasoning, or some reference to other constraining
standards. Thus, crucially, many such permitting schemes will pose lesser
risks, to one degree or another, to the basic free speech values. 72 No general
presumption as to the degree of viewpoint-burdensomeness may thus be
presumed in these kinds of cases.
D.

Judicial-Level Viewpoint Obliviousness Cases

In the obverse kinds of cases, it is crucially the courts themselves that fail
to recognize, or acknowledge, an at least debatable potential of the
government regulation for one degree or another of viewpoint-bias in
application.
Consider, for example, a recent federal appellate case involving
corporate self-branding by using an ethnic slur as a trade name. 73 Sensibly
finding viewpoint-based speech discrimination in the Destito case,74 the
Second Circuit therein also claimed that government disapproval of a
message is “the essence of viewpoint discrimination” 75 and, without much
elaboration or explanation, that a regulation can somehow be viewpointbased even if it is an “across-the-board prohibition applicable to all speakers
without regard to their intended messages.” 76
For our present purposes, though, the Destito case is interesting for its
intriguing claim that Title VII restrictions on workplace speech do not count
as viewpoint-based restrictions on speech because such regulations limit
merely verbal conduct, rather than expression. 77 Thus language that, under
Title VII, may contribute to a hostile work environment may be
constitutionally prohibited.78 Legal restriction of some workplace harassing
speech may, in the court’s words, amount to “viewpoint disparity,” but as mere
conduct regulation, does not also amount to viewpoint-based restriction of
speech.79 At a minimum, then, the differences between viewpoint-based
restrictions, subject to strict scrutiny if not to absolute prohibition, 80 and the

72 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
73 Wandering Dago, Inc. v Destito, 879 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2018).
74 See id. at 33.
75 Id. at 32 (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
76 Id. at 33.
77 See id. at 32.
78 See id.
79 See id. For background, see, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000)
(commercial nude dancing); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (public flag burning);
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (public draft card burning case); Arnold H.
Loewy, Distinguishing Speech From Conduct, 45 MERCER L. REV. 621 (1994); Caroline Mala
Corbin, Speech Or Conduct: The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 241
(2015).
80 See supra text accompanying notes 12–13; Maura Douglas, Comment, Finding
Viewpoint Neutrality in Our Constitutional Constellation, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 727, 738 (2018)
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murky notion of mere “viewpoint disparity,” 81 subject potentially to mere
rationality review,82 must be somehow clarified.
A separate attempt to distinguish “directed”83 from undirected,84 and
supposedly thus much less objectionable, 85 viewpoint-based speech
restrictions is present in the artistic subsidy case of National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley. In Finley, the federal artistic subsidy program required that grant
applications be judged not only on the basis of artistic merit, but “taking into
consideration general standards of decency” as well. 86
The Finley majority argued first that the “general standards of decency”
consideration should not count as a viewpoint-based restriction on speech, in
that the “decency” factor was not a classic prohibition of disfavored thought. 87
While free speech considerations can certainly arise in a government subsidy
context,88 the “decency” criterion was not “the kind of directed viewpoint
discrimination that would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on its
face.”89 Speakers were not therein silenced.90 There was no express threat of
the censorship of ideas. 91 No “realistic danger [of a] compromise [of] First
Amendment values” was thought to be present.92
Not surprisingly, several of the Justices in Finley took issue with one or
more of these claims. Justice Scalia found that the “decency” consideration
“unquestionably constitutes viewpoint discrimination.” 93 That the viewpoint
consideration did not amount to an absolute or blanket prohibition of
applications deemed to be indecent went only to the reduced gravity of the
viewpoint-based restriction. 94

(“Despite the heavy presumption against viewpoint discrimination, the Supreme Court has
never made a per se rule on its (un)constitutionality.”).
81 See supra text accompanying note 79.
82 See generally Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-Basis Review and Same-Sex
Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281, 288 (2011); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 30–32 (1972). For more background, see the logic of the Court in the public employment
case of New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592–593 (1979).
83 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 583 (1998). For commentary,
see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content-Neutral and Content/Viewpoint
Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 627 (2003).
84 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 583.
85 See id. at 587–88.
86 Id. at 572.
87 See id. at 583–88.
88 See id. at 587.
89 Id. at 583.
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 Id.
93 See id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S.
Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (“Giving offense is a viewpoint.”). For commentary on Matal, see
Calvert, supra note 12.
94 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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For Justice Scalia, though, this viewpoint-based restriction on speech in
Finley was an “abridgement” of the freedom of speech in only a limited sense,
and only to a limited and nearly inconsequential degree. 95 Evidently, not all
viewpoint-based restrictions of speech are created even roughly equal in
constitutional significance. Those persons who wish to create “indecent” art
were, for Justice Scalia, just as free to do so as before.96 The only limit was that
those who create “indecent” art were disadvantaged in applying for a federal
government subsidy thereof.97
A third view of the matter in Finley was taken by Justice Souter.98 Justice
Souter declared that “[t]he decency . . . proviso mandates viewpoint-based
decisions in the disbursement of Government subsidies.” 99 Further, “the
Government has wholly failed to explain why the statute should be afforded
an exemption from the fundamental rule . . . that viewpoint discrimination in
the exercise of public authority over expressive activity is unconstitutional.” 100
In defense of this approach, Justice Souter drew upon the classic caselaw
apparently adopting an absolutist prohibition of viewpoint-based restrictions
of speech.101
The Finley case opinions, taken together, thus illustrate, along more than
one dimension, the remarkable range of available judicial approaches to what
is plausibly characterized as a viewpoint-based discrimination against speech.
Again, our point is not to adjudicate among this range of approaches on the
merits. It is merely to record the judicial disputes in Finley as further evidence
for the ordinarily unrecognized broad range of viewpoint-based restrictions
on speech. These crucial differences generally do not reflect differences in
the weight of any public interests thought to justify the speech regulation in
question. Rather, these variations reflect important differences in the nature
and gravity of the viewpoint-based restriction itself.
E.

First- and Second-Order Viewpoint-Based Restrictions

Equally important further complications arose in the foreign embassy
protest case of Boos v. Barry.102 Boos nicely illustrates some of the problems
that arise when an arguably viewpoint-based restriction on speech reflects not
the actual, first-order, substantive beliefs of the restricting government itself,
but that government’s attempt, for one reason or another, to politically

95 See id. at 595–96.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 Id. at 600 (Souter, J., dissenting).
99 Id. See also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1761–63 (2017). For a critique, see
Calvert, supra note 12.
100 Finley, 524 U.S. at 600–01, 603 (Souter, J., dissenting).
101 Including Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989), and Police Department of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
102 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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accommodate the speech-restrictive preferences of some other group,
whether that group is politically powerful or not.
Boos involved a local District of Columbia regulation that prohibited, in
part, “the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if that sign
tends to bring a foreign government into ‘public odium’ or ‘public
disrepute.’”103 Such a restriction might be considered viewpoint-neutral, in
that neither the enacting government authority, nor any other party, can be
certain in advance of the restriction’s actual political impact, in practice, years
later. Presumably, the enacting government need not really hold the view
that no foreign government should ever be subjected to the relevant risk of
public odium or disrepute. 104 And this speech prohibition could be applied
against demonstrations favored by the enacting government against a foreign
government to which the enacting government vehemently objects.
In this limited sense, the rule of Boos could be thought of as viewpointneutral. But in a broader sense, attention to viewpoint is crucial to the
application of the regulation. Any sign that is subject to the regulation would
first have to be read, understood, and interpreted with regard to its message.
And crucially, messages favorable to a particular government or policy would
then be permitted, while critical messages tending to evoke odium or
disrepute would not.105 The viewpoint of the demonstrator, the foreign
government, and perhaps even of the United States would thus be directly
implicated.
Among the most interesting complications would be cases in which the
rule-enacting government fully agrees with the message of the demonstrators
but prohibits the demonstration pursuant to the regulation. Such cases would
be driven by the viewpoint-hostility not of the rule-enacting government, but
of the foreign government subject to criticism, as merely accommodated,
without sympathy on the merits, by the speech-restriction enacting
government.
This latter possibility illustrates the much broader phenomenon in
which a regulating government adopts a viewpoint-based restriction not
because of that government’s own first-order lack of sympathy with the speech

103 Boos, 485 U.S. at 315. For commentary, see Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints From
Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 701 (1996) (“[T]he meaning of ‘viewpoint’ is ambiguous
in this context.”).
104 See Boos, 485 U.S. at 315. The Court in Boos held the restriction to be content-based,
but not viewpoint-based, or at least not “directly” viewpoint based. Id. at 319. The
regulation was held to distinguish among permitted and prohibited viewpoints “in a neutral
fashion by looking to the policies of foreign governments.” Id. Query, though, whether we
would also think of a heckler’s veto rule as viewpoint neutral if the permitted heckling met
a similarly neutral criterion such as by looking to a current voting majority. See generally
Wright, supra note 8.
105 See Boos, 485 U.S. at 319. It is certainly possible that some critical messages may not
also be judged to tend to bring the targeted government into odium or disrepute. Less
realistically, a demonstration intended to support a government or its policy might backfire,
and indeed tend to bring the foreign government into disrepute.
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on the merits, but merely to accommodate the views of one or more
nongovernmental groups that oppose the regulated speech on the merits.
And there is no reason to believe that the groups thereby granted a sort of
“veto” over the speech they disfavor will all be politically powerful.
At least on some occasions, a regulating government might thus suppress
speech to which it has no serious objection on the merits, mostly in order to
accommodate a disadvantaged or stigmatized group.106 It is also possible that
a government might restrict speech of a particular viewpoint, to which it has
little objection, for the sake of some value such as social peace, community,
or some form of equality. This regulatory choice could politically mirror the
interpersonal virtues of politeness, sensitivity, restraint, and tact.
A viewpoint regulation motivated by such considerations might well then
be properly judged on standards quite distinct from an absolute prohibition,
or even strict scrutiny. In the most innocently motivated cases, with the lowest
potential for harm to the basic free speech values, 107 some sort of alternative
test, including judicial balancing or proportionality,108 if not a version of
minimum scrutiny,109 might be called for.
F.

The Importance of Any Disparities in the Value of Any Remaining Speech
Channels

A further crucial dimension along which viewpoint-based speech
restrictions vary widely in their effects focuses on whether the regulated
speakers have available to them one or more realistic alternative channels in
which to convey the message in question, without any meaningful loss in the
basic free speech values,110 as judged crucially by the regulated parties
themselves.111 A viewpoint-based regulation that, for practical purposes,
prevents the meaningful delivery of a disfavored message is one thing. A
viewpoint-based regulation that allows the regulated speaker equally good or
better access, from their own free speech value standpoint, to alternative
speech channels in which to convey their message, is quite another. The latter

106 As well, there will be gradations among the cases in which the regulating
government has mixed motives in adopting the viewpoint regulation. The objectionability
of such viewpoint-based speech restrictions may correspondingly vary.
107 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
108 For one elaborated version, see AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012). See also ROBERT ALEXY, A
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 66 (Julian Rivers trans., 2010 ed.) (2002). For a
broader legal perspective, see the essays collected in PROPORTIONALITY: NEW FRONTIERS,
NEW CHALLENGES (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, eds., 2017).
109 See supra text accompanying note 82.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
111 This inquiry is utterly distinct from the more familiar examination of the
“tailoring,” narrow or otherwise, of the actual scope a regulation to its intended purpose.
See generally R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law and the Central
Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. 57 (1989).
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sort of viewpoint-based restriction on speech is, almost by definition,
constitutionally nearly harmless.
Imagine, for example, a viewpoint-based rule that prevents conservative
Republican billionaires, but not progressive Democrat billionaires, from
promoting their political candidacy through cardboard signs attached to
telephone poles. Regardless of how such a rule might be enforced, its effect
on any regulated party’s speech, or on the rights of any voter who wishes to
hear the candidate’s message, could well be trivial, if not actually slightly
favorable. Any affected party would still have equal or better ways, from their
own free speech values standpoint, of communicating the ideas in question. 112
The overall free speech value loss could be minimal, nonexistent, or even
slightly negative.
We see recognizable suggestions of this possibility in some familiar
caselaw. Consider for instance, the well-known flag burning protest case of
Texas v. Johnson.113 The majority in Johnson explained that “Johnson was
prosecuted because he knew that his politically charged expression would
cause ‘serious offense.’”114 After all, the State of Texas had no objections to
the idea of safely and environmentally responsibly burning an American flag.
Burning an American flag is recognized as an appropriate method of disposal
thereof.115 It is only when burning the flag amounts to desecration, as in
sending a message of contempt or disdain, that such an act is criminalized. 116
This clearly amounts to a form of viewpoint-based discrimination against
one category of symbolic speech. Perhaps the most relevant viewpointresponder is the Texas state government, or more crucially, the segment of
the Texas population that would take “serious offense” to politically
motivated flag desecration. It is possible that the Texas state officials
themselves had no serious objection to politicized flag burning, but felt that
popular sentiment, or some segment thereof, left them no choice.
The main dissenting opinion in Johnson, though, raises a crucial concern.
The defendant Johnson had also engaged in a number of more conspicuous
public protest events and activities at the Republican National Convention. 117
These activities included leading marches and protests, engaging in a “diein,” and protest chanting.118
Whether any of these other protest events by Johnson had any causal role
in motivating his flag-burning arrest may be unclear. But as the main

112 Consider, merely for example, the continuing availability of televised debates,
dedicated websites, various social media, as well as paid radio and television time.
113 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
114 Id. at 411.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 431 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
118 See id.
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dissenting opinion points out, Johnson was not criminally charged with any
of the above contemporaneous and similarly-themed protest activities.119
The main dissent then argues, interestingly, that the fact that Texas
allowed Johnson to engage in various sorts of similar, perhaps even more
articulate, forms of dramatic protest bears significantly upon the extent and
degree to which Johnson’s free speech rights, given his own basic free speech
value priorities, were really inhibited. 120 Hence the dissenters’ argument in
Johnson that “[f]ar from being a case of ‘one picture being worth a thousand
words,’ flag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that . . .
is most likely to be indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to
antagonize others.”121
Thus the main dissenting opinion looked to the viewpoint-based speech
restriction’s actual effects on Johnson’s ability to authentically and effectively
express his political message. The conclusion was that the relevant “statute
deprived Johnson of only one rather inarticulate symbolic form of protest . . .
and left him with a full panoply of other symbols and every conceivable form
of verbal expression to express his deep 122 disapproval of national policy.”123
Johnson was thought to have expressed “nothing that could not have been
conveyed . . . just as forcefully in a dozen different ways.”124
The dissenting opinion in question thus focused on the availability, or
not, of one or more alternative speech channels remaining available to
Johnson, ideally with a deferential acknowledgement of Johnson’s own
speech priorities as to, for example, intensity versus articulateness, size and
selection of audience, public visibility, and financial costs, along with any
other relevant consideration.125
The crucial point is that some persons whose speech is somehow limited
on the basis of viewpoint may still have available to them alternative speech
channels that are just as good, in terms of their own priorities among free
speech values, and other such speakers may not. This sort of free speech
impairment is a matter of varying degrees and dimensions in different cases.
In general, viewpoint-based speech restrictions that leave the speaker
essentially unimpaired in disseminating their message are dramatically
different in nature and consequences from viewpoint-based restrictions that
largely, if not entirely, prevent the speaker from presenting anything like the
targeted message in any forum.

119 See id.
120 See id.
121 Id. at 432. We may assume that a desire purely to antagonize other persons, even
in a political context, is at best only poorly related to the basic free speech values. See supra
text accompanying notes 54–58.
122 Or at least, emotionally intense. For an emphasis on the constitutional value of
what the Court refers to as “emotive” speech, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
123 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 431.
125 See generally Wright, supra note 111.
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We can understand why viewpoint-based restrictions might evoke strict
scrutiny, if not an absolute prohibition, in the latter, more serious kinds of
cases.126 But it is far less clear why a viewpoint-based restriction that has only
a negligible or even a net favorable effect on the free speech values of the
affected parties should be tested by any rigorous judicial standard. 127
A further illustration of this theme is the controversial Indianapolis
pornography ordinance case of American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut.128 In this
case, Judge Frank Easterbrook began with the assertion that “[u]nder the First
Amendment the government must leave to the people the evaluation of
ideas.”129 Judge Easterbrook then noted that the Indianapolis ordinance
purported to regulate not all graphic sexually explicit depictions of women,
but only those depictions that involved the “subordination” of women. 130
The ordinance thus, in that sense, established an officially approved view
of women.131 And according to Judge Easterbrook, those who adopt the
approved view may use graphic, sexually explicit depictions of women in their
communications, while those who do not adopt that approved view may not. 132
On this basis, Judge Easterbrook then struck down this viewpoint-based
speech regulation,133 even while explicitly assuming, at least hypothetically,
the existence of a compelling governmental interest in preventing serious
harms to women,134 and while recognizing that counter-speech is not a
meaningful response to a harmful pornographic image. 135
Rather than at least hypothetically sacrifice the compelling interest of
women in not being physically assaulted for the sake of avoiding a particular
viewpoint-based speech restriction, we would do well to consider the rule’s
actual impact on freedom of speech. 136
Suppose we assume, perhaps controversially, 137 that a potential
pornographic speaker in this American Booksellers case intended to convey
some constitutionally sufficient idea within the scope of coverage of the Free
Speech Clause. 138 This idea would of course have to be conveyable by means
126 This point assumes that the weight of any state interest in restricting the expression
of a viewpoint can be set temporarily aside for purposes of doing the crucial alternative
speech channels analysis.
127 See supra text accompanying note 82.
128 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (mem.).
129 Id. at 327.
130 See id. at 328–329.
131 See id. at 328, 332.
132 See id. at 328.
133 See id. at 334.
134 See id.
135 See id. at 330.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 122–27.
137 See generally R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the First Place?: Determining
the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217 (2010).
138 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 54, at 89–92 (drawing a distinction between the range
or scope of protection of speech and the degree or intensity of any protection of covered
speech).
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of the graphic, sexually explicit depiction of the subordination of women. 139
Otherwise, it would not be subject to the ordinance in question.140
But then, the vital question becomes: What idea can be conveyed only
through the graphic, sexually explicit depiction of the subordination of
women, and, crucially, by no other means? Why, to begin, must the assumed
idea be conveyed graphically? And sexually explicitly? And through whatever
counts as a depiction? Why wouldn’t some even slight departure from this
combination of characteristics allow the speaker to convey the relevant
message while preserving that speaker’s free speech priorities as to
communication?
It may well be that the specific form of pornography restricted by the
Indianapolis ordinance was, for some restricted speaker, the most financially
lucrative available business opportunity. But we are not constitutionally
concerned with the overall state of mind of the speaker, or with their income
level, apart from their priorities with respect, precisely, to the free speech
values promoted by the expression of some minimally sufficient idea.
Maximizing profits need not be the same thing as, or require, maximizing the
free speech values associated with expressing some particular message. It is
at best unclear what particular message must, in practice, be conveyed in a
manner that violates the narrow Indianapolis ordinance, and not essentially
equally well, or better, by some other, legally permitted means.
But now let us assume that any other remaining alternative way of
conveying the speaker’s idea must, to at least some minimal degree, distort or
otherwise impair the speaker’s message. If we are still, with Judge
Easterbrook, assuming the existence of a compelling government interest
underlying the ordinance, we must then ask a further question: Is any minimal
loss in overall free speech values attributable to this narrow ordinance worth
anything remotely like the assumed resulting increase in violent attacks upon
women?141
That is, why couldn’t a hypothetical minimal loss in free speech values
be balanced against, and grossly outweighed by, any degree of an assumed
resulting reduction in violent attacks against innocent victims? This is a
matter of judgment at the margins, 142 and not at all a matter of entirely
abolishing all freedom of speech, in some specific context, for some payoff.143
The broader point is, again, that not all viewpoint-based restrictions of
speech are anywhere near equally “egregious.” 144 Some viewpoint-based
speech restrictions, as in American Booksellers, are not egregious at all because

139 See American Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 328.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 329.
142 See, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS bk. V, ch. VIII (8th ed.
1920) (1890) (discussing the economic principle of decisionmaking on the margin).
143 Given the uncertainties on both sides of this kind of balancing, we could adopt any
presumption, or make any adjustment to the weighing process, we thought appropriate.
144 See supra text accompanying note 4.
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they only narrowly and minimally impact speech,145 even if we ignore any
compelling interests they might also promote.
G.

Viewpoint Discrimination as Crucial to Essential Institutional Functioning

But the sorts of cases noted immediately above are merely another
category of viewpoint-based restrictions of speech in which the severity of the
restriction is either quite variable, or else commonly minimal. As a distinct
further category, consider the cases in which it might plausibly be claimed
that some viewpoint-based restrictions of speech are not merely slightly
favorable to overall free speech values, but are essential to the functioning of
what we take to be an indispensable public institution. In particular, consider
the problem of viewpoint-based restrictions of student speech in public
schools.146
The judicial test applied in public school speech regulation cases may
depend upon whether the school administration is clearly speaking on its own
behalf;147 whether a student is speaking with the apparent approval of the
school;148 or whether the student is clearly speaking on her own behalf.149
Among the cases considering a possible role for viewpoint-based
restrictions of speech attributable solely to a student is the “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” banner display case of Morse v. Frederick.150 In Morse, Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for a plurality, held that public “schools may take steps to
safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.”151 Chief Justice Roberts explained

145 But see American Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 330 (expressing an ultimate fear of
government as “in control of all the institutions of culture, the great censor and director of
which thoughts are good for us”).
146 See generally, e.g., Susannah Barton Tobin, Divining Hazelwood: The Need for a
Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 217 (2004);
Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on SchoolSponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63 (2008); R. George Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the
Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175 (2007); Alexis Zouhary,
The Elephant in the Classroom: A Proposed Framework for Applying Viewpoint Neutrality to Student
Speech in the Secondary School Setting, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2227 (2008).
147 See generally Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 695 (2011); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008); Note, Three’s a Crowd—Defending the Binary
Approach to Government Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2011).
148 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (leaving unclear
whether viewpoint-based restrictions in such cases must be not only legitimate and
reasonable, but viewpoint-neutral as well).
149 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (black arm
band protest of the Vietnam War); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (vulgar
speech by student at a student election assembly).
150 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
151 Id.
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that “deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed, perhaps
compelling’ interest.”152
Let us assume that Mr. Frederick’s displaying the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”
banner involved expression of a message sufficiently coherent to fall within
the scope of First Amendment coverage.153 The question then becomes
whether the speech restriction at issue was recognizably viewpoint-based. And
the answer seems clear. A banner that called for discussion of the possible
harms of illegal drug use among public high school students would not have
been censored, and certainly would not have fallen within the logic of Chief
Justice Roberts’s reasoning.154 A banner that was perceived as, in whatever
respect, critical of such illegal drug use would clearly not have been
censored.155
Thus the dissenting opinion in Morse argued “the Court does serious
violence to the First Amendment in upholding—indeed, lauding—a school’s
decision to punish Frederick for expressing a view with which it disagreed.”156 At
the most general level, any rule that permits the expression of message “A,”
while prohibiting the otherwise similarly situated expression of message “notA,” should be presumed to be based, in one way or another, on viewpoint.
Yet the plurality opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, in the case of a
viewpoint-based speech restriction, referred to either a compelling or to a
merely “important” governmental interest, without engaging in any especially
rigorous investigation of causation or any narrowness of tailoring. 157
This judicial laxity of Chief Justice Roberts in the face of a viewpointbased restriction of speech is best explained by emphasizing the public school
educational context,158 its “special characteristics,”159 and the presumed vital
public functions of the essential institution of the public-school system. Public
schools, at least at certain grade levels, are not intended to serve as indoor
public fora, as debating societies, or even as the site of general and open
discussion groups. Such schools have other, typically imperfectly achieved,
purposes.
152 Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
153 See supra text accompanying notes 137–38. Certainly, one could reasonably argue
to the contrary. See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 433, 434–35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The banner
in question was raised on a public sidewalk, and thus in a traditional public forum, but in
the course of an official school function. See id. at 400–01 (majority opinion).
154 See supra text accompanying note 153.
155 See id. Had a banner critical of drug use been lewd, indecent, or vulgar in
expression, the case might then fall under the rule espoused in Bethel School District v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
156 Morse, 551 U.S. at 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justices Alito and
Kennedy attempted to draw a viable distinction between the unprotected advocacy of illegal
drug use and protected commentary “on any political or social issue,” including drugrelated issues. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
157 See supra text accompanying note 155.
158 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
159 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
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In some small measure, the mission of the public schools as an institution
involves both educating about and appropriately discouraging the use by
students of illegal drugs.160 Much more broadly, and much more essentially,
the public schools as an indispensable institution exist to promote the
transmission of both a broad range of knowledge and basic cultural values
including sufficient civility, mutual respect, a recognition of basic equality
among persons, and reciprocal recognition and tolerance. 161 And these basic
cultural values are, not at all surprisingly, linked to the promotion of the
fundamental free speech values themselves, 162 including the optimal pursuit
of truth, an effectively functioning democratic self-government, and the
opportunity for optimal self-realization.163
These essential institutional purposes of the public school system largely
explain why clearly viewpoint-based restrictions on speech in public schools
may evoke something short of traditional strict scrutiny, much less any
absolute prohibition. 164 In some such cases, courts may recognize that the
viewpoint-neutrality requirement normally applied elsewhere, even to socalled nonpublic fora, may not be appropriate for pure student speech
contexts, given the schools’ institutional purposes and values. 165

160 See id. at 407–08.
161 See, crucially, the logic of the fundamental public school desegregation case of
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 683 (1986). More theoretically, see JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
19–20 (Dover ed. 2004) (1916). In the context of arguably officially endorsed student
speech, see Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72 (1988). For the case
of a public school library book removal, see Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879–80
(1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
162 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
163 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683–85; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271–72. Notice, relatedly, how
restrictions on the display in public schools of Confederate flags are typically upheld on
grounds of reasonably anticipated disorder, where the free speech values of the “targets”
or victims of Confederate flag display could also be implicated as well. See, e.g., Hardwick
ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 438 (4th Cir. 2013); Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva,
674 F.3d 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2011) (Boggs, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc);
A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir 2009); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7
Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 736–38 (8th Cir. 2009); Barr v. Lafon, 553 F.3d 463, 466 (6th Cir.
2009). Or more broadly, consider the Title VII workplace treatment of the display of
Confederate flags, as distinct from flags conveying other messages, as in Ellis v. CCA of
Tennessee, LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[D]isplays of confederate flags in the
workplace may support a hostile work environment claim.”); Watson v. CEVA Logistics US,
Inc., 619 F.3d 936, 938–39 (8th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 157 (4th Cir.
2009); Renfroe v. IAC Greencastle, LLC, 385 F. Supp. 3d 692, 704 (S.D. Ind. 2019).
164 See supra text accompanying notes 3–5, 11, 13.
165 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 871 (allowing the removal of public school library books judged
to be “pervasively vulgar” or “educational[ly] [un]suitab[le]”). Inescapably, these
judgments must involve reflection not only on the content of the books, but on the
worthiness of the ideas, messages, or views expressed therein. But see id. at 872 (arguing to
the contrary). See also Walker v. Tex. Div. of Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2251 (2015) (brief survey of the evolving forms of public fora); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
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Viewpoint Discrimination Against Speech Categories of Lesser Constitutional
Significance

In yet another class of viewpoint-based restriction cases, courts may shy
away from forthrightly adopting either strict scrutiny or speech-protective
absolutism because of a judicial sense, whether universally shared or not, that
the very nature of the general type or category of the speech itself is of only
diminished constitutional significance.
Consider, for example, the otherwise puzzling commercial speech case
of Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.166 Sorrell involved Vermont’s restrictions on the
disclosure of pharmacy records that would indicate the drug prescription
practices of particular physicians, which would clearly be of commercial
interest to parties seeking to increase their market share of prescription drug
sales.167
The Court in Sorrell indicated that the speech restriction in question
disfavored some speech based on viewpoint. 168 In particular, the restriction
burdened those who would use the information obtained for commercial, but
not for educational, speech purposes.169 Crucially, the Court held that the
Vermont law “on its face burdens disfavored speech by disfavored speakers,”170 thus
amounting not only to content-discrimination, but as well to viewpoint-based
discrimination.171
If viewpoint-based speech discrimination were uniformly abhorrent or
egregious,172 one might well expect the Court in Sorrell to have said so, and
then tested the relevant statute by strict scrutiny, if not by an absolutist
standard. But this is not how the Court in Sorrell in fact proceeded. Instead,
the Court concluded merely that the speech regulation at issue would
supposedly fail a range of elevated, or heightened, degrees of judicial
scrutiny.173 The particular degree of elevated scrutiny applied was thus
irrelevant, and therefore need not be specified. 174 The dissenters in the case,
interestingly, would not have applied any form of elevated judicial scrutiny,
and would have upheld the state regulation of speech. 175

Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992) (rejecting viewpoint-based, but not
all content-based, speech restrictions in nonpublic fora).
166 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
167 See id. at 557–58.
168 See id. at 563–64.
169 See id. at 564. Of course, if one declines to view this sort of speech restriction as in
any sense based on viewpoint, that would further complicate the logic of the scope and
defensibility of the law of viewpoint-based restrictions on speech.
170 Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
171 See id. at 565, 571.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 3–4.
173 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557, 571–80.
174 See id. at 571 (citing Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S.
173, 184 (1999)).
175 See id. at 580–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The Court’s carefully specified reluctance in Sorrell to clearly and
explicitly subject the viewpoint regulation in question to the most rigorous
forms of judicial scrutiny stems, certainly, from a judicial reluctance to decide
what need not presently be decided. But it stems as well from a widely, but
not universally, shared sense that even nonmisleading, nonfraudulent
commercial speech, without any inseparable elements of political speech, is
generally unworthy of the same level of constitutional protection as core
political speech,176 even where viewpoint-based restriction of such purely
commercial messages is present.177
Whether freedom of pure and nonmisleading commercial speech, as a
category, tends to promote the basic free speech values 178 of pursuing the
truth, democratic self-government, and self-realization as much as freedom of
political speech is vigorously debated.179 To the extent that some courts, in
some contexts, perceive differences between the free speech value of
commercial and of political speech, viewpoint-based restrictions of pure
commercial speech may understandably be tested in less than rigorous
fashion.
CONCLUSION
It is widely taken for granted that viewpoint-based restrictions of speech
are, as a class, especially disfavored, meriting either absolute prohibition or
strict scrutiny. As it turns out, however, this common assumption is both
descriptively incorrect and normatively unjustifiable.
A typology of the various basic forms of viewpoint-based restriction on
speech supports this initially surprising claim. This typology can be
constructed out of the obvious uncertainties, ambiguities, equivocations, and
gaps found in the viewpoint-restriction cases.
There are, certainly, genuinely egregious cases of viewpoint-based
restrictions. But these cases do not begin to exhaust the range of the
possibilities. There are also mixed-motive viewpoint-based restriction cases,
where the governmental motives, apart from the weight of any governmental
interest, may vary widely in their degree of objectionability. In other cases,
the government enacting the viewpoint-based restriction may be more or less
unaware of the viewpoint-based effects of the speech restriction in question.

176 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–
63 (1984) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
177 See supra text accompanying notes 168–71. Whether discrimination against
speakers who use the data for commercial speech purposes, as compared to other speakers
who use that same data for noncommercial purposes, should be classified as viewpointbased discrimination is debatable.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
179 For a sense of the relevant arguments, see, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S
WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 79–93 (2016); C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment
and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981 (2009). For background, see the arguments in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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Sometimes it is the courts themselves that are oblivious to the viewpoint-based
effects of the regulation in question. In a further class of cases, the viewpointbased restriction does not at all reflect the enacting government’s own firstorder substantive preferences on the merits.
Instead, the enacting
government is expressing only its own second-order preferences, not on the
merits, but as among the various groups who may or may not favor the speech
restriction, in general or on a specific occasion. The enacting government
may in such cases be accommodating groups, large or small, or else generally
politically weak and disenfranchised, or relatively powerful.
As well, viewpoint-based restrictions of speech may well not leave the
regulated speakers and audiences in any meaningfully worse position with
respect to anyone’s own authentic basic free speech values and priorities. In
such cases, the regulated speakers may be unaffected, or even better off, in
terms of their own free speech values, because the speakers still have available
alternative speech channels through which to convey their message as well, as
before.
And in yet other viewpoint-based restriction cases, the crucial
complication is again not the weight of the government interest at stake, but
an understandable reluctance to impose strict scrutiny, much less an absolute
prohibition, on the speech regulation in question. Public schools, for
example, collectively qualify as social institutions that, by their very nature,
purposes, and functions, properly resist the broad application of strict
scrutiny to viewpoint-based restrictions of much student speech.
Finally, there are cases in which the general category or class of speech
in question is thought by many, but certainly not all, to implicate less strongly,
if at all, the basic values and purposes underlying the idea of special legal
protection for speech. At least some instances of even nonmisleading pure
commercial speech are often thought to fall in this category. And on this
assumption, it is not surprising that even viewpoint-based restrictions on the
category of speech in question do not evoke strict scrutiny, let alone an
absolute prohibition of such regulations.
In general, then, we may say that viewpoint-based restrictions of speech
can and should, depending on type and context, evoke any number of cheers
from between zero and three.

